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ARTICLE
Homodyne-based quantum random number
generator at 2.9 Gbps secure against quantum
side-information
Tobias Gehring 1,5✉, Cosmo Lupo2,3,5, Arne Kordts1, Dino Solar Nikolic1, Nitin Jain1, Tobias Rydberg1,
Thomas B. Pedersen4, Stefano Pirandola 2 & Ulrik L. Andersen 1✉
Quantum random number generators promise perfectly unpredictable random numbers. A
popular approach to quantum random number generation is homodyne measurements of the
vacuum state, the ground state of the electro-magnetic field. Here we experimentally
implement such a quantum random number generator, and derive a security proof that
considers quantum side-information instead of classical side-information only. Based on the
assumptions of Gaussianity and stationarity of noise processes, our security analysis fur-
thermore includes correlations between consecutive measurement outcomes due to finite
detection bandwidth, as well as analog-to-digital converter imperfections. We characterize
our experimental realization by bounding measured parameters of the stochastic model
determining the min-entropy of the system’s measurement outcomes, and we demonstrate a
real-time generation rate of 2.9 Gbit/s. Our generator follows a trusted, device-dependent,
approach. By treating side-information quantum mechanically an important restriction on
adversaries is removed, which usually was reserved to semi-device-independent and device-
independent schemes.
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andom numbers are ubiquitous in modern society1. They
are used in numerous applications ranging from crypto-
graphy, simulations, and gambling, to fundamental tests of
physics. For most of these applications, the quality of the random
numbers is of utmost importance. If, for instance, cryptographic
keys originating from random numbers are predictable, it will
have severe consequences for the security of the internet. To
ensure the security of cryptographic encryption, the random
numbers used to generate the secret encryption key must be
completely unpredictable, private, and their randomness must be
certified.
True unpredictability and privacy of the generated numbers
can be attained through a quantum measurement process: by
performing a projective measurement on a pure quantum state,
and ensuring that the state is not an eigenstate of the measure-
ment projector, the outcome is unpredictable and thus true
random numbers can be generated2. Moreover, the generated
numbers can be private since a pure state cannot be correlated to
any other state in the universe.
Numerous different types of quantum random number gen-
erators (QRNGs) have been devised exploiting the quantum
uncertainty in photon counting measurements, phase measure-
ments, or quadrature measurements3–5. One particular approach of
increasing interest due to its high practicality is the optical quad-
rature measurements of the vacuum state by means of a simple
homodyne detection6–8. This approach combines simplicity, cost-
effectiveness, chip integrability, and high generation speed.
State-of-the art security proofs for such QRNGs assumed that
the information available in the environment about the mea-
surement outcomes, so-called side information, is of classical
nature8. Recently, quantum side information was taken into
account for a source-independent QRNG9–12, which however
requires a more complex measurement apparatus.
Furthermore, it has been assumed in the security proof that
subsequent measurement outcomes of QRNGs based on homo-
dyning of vacuum states are uncorrelated in time. Therefore,
experiments dealt with the unavoidable correlations caused by the
finite bandwidth of the detection system by exploiting aliasing in
the sampling procedure or by using suitable post-processing
algorithms6–8,11,13–20. Such measures usually throttle the overall
rate considerably or remove the correlations only partially.
A rigorous characterization of the system is of utmost impor-
tance as any parameter uncertainty introduces a non-zero prob-
ability for system failure, i.e., the probability that the actual device
does not follow the stochastic model describing the underlying
physical random number generation process. Knowing the failure
probability for the system is critical to its certification. Previously
this metrology-grade approach was used for phase fluctuation
QRNGs21. This includes that imperfect analog-to-digital con-
version is taken into account.
Real-time field-programmable-gate-array (FPGA) imple-
mentations of randomness extraction with Gbit/s-speed using an
information theoretically secure Toeplitz randomness extractor
have been demonstrated recently12,18–20,22. Previously reported
QRNG implementations achieved only moderate speeds or did
not extract random numbers in real time6–8,11,13–17.
Here we devise a security analysis for QRNGs based on
quadrature measurements of the (trusted) vacuum state that takes
quantum side information into account. Our security analysis is
based on the assumptions of stationarity and Gaussianity of the
involved noise processes. We include correlations of measure-
ment outcomes in the security proof as well as the imperfections
of analog-to-digital conversion. We experimentally implement
the QRNG and use a conservative and rigorous approach to
characterize the parameters of the stochastic model that deter-
mines the amount of randomness. To establish a conservative
bound with confidence intervals on the amount of vacuum
fluctuations, we devise an experimental procedure based on a
measurement of the transfer function (TF) of the measuring
device. Using real-time Toeplitz randomness extraction imple-
mented in an FPGA, we achieve a rate of 2.9 Gbit/s.
Results
Setting the stage. A schematic of our QRNG is shown in Fig. 1.
An arbitrary quadrature of the vacuum state is measured using a
balanced homodyne detector comprising a bright reference beam,
a nominal symmetric beam splitter, and two photo diodes23. The
measurement outcomes ideally are random with a Gaussian
distribution associated with the Gaussian Wigner function of the
vacuum state24. The measured distribution, however, contains
two additional independent noise sources: excess optical noise
and electronic noise, thereby contributing two side channels.
These must be accounted for in estimating the min-entropy of the
source.
The amount of quantum randomness that can be extracted
from the homodyne measurement of vacuum fluctuations is given





Here HminðXjEÞ is the min-entropy of a single measurement
outcome drawn from a random variable X conditioned on the
quantum side information E, N is the number of aggregated
samples, and ϵhash is the distance between a perfectly uniform
random string and the string produced by a randomness
extractor. It is therefore clear that we need to find the min-
entropy of our practical—thus imperfect—realization in order to
bound the amount of randomness. We achieve this in a two-step
approach: First, we theoretically derive a bound for the min-
entropy using a realistic model and express it in terms of
experimentally accessible parameters. Second, we experimentally
deduce these parameters through a conservative and rigorous
characterization. Using such an approach, we find the worst-case
min-entropy compatible with the confidence intervals of our
Fig. 1 Schematic of the quantum random number generator. A 1.6 mW 1550 nm laser beam was split into two by a 3 dB fiber coupler and detected by a
home-made homodyne detector based on an MAR-6 microwave amplifier from Minicircuits and two 120 μm indium–gallium–arsenide photo diodes (PD).
The output of the detector was amplified with another microwave amplifier, low pass filtered at 400MHz, and digitized with a 16 bit 1-GSample/s analog-
to-digital converter (ADC). The ADC output was read by a Xilinx Kintex UltraScale field-programmable gate array (FPGA). The ADC and FPGA were
hosted by a PCI Express card from 4DSP (Abaco). The FPGA was used for real-time randomness extraction based on Toeplitz hashing. Random access
memory (RAM) was used to store the output.
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characterization and calibration measurements, thereby obtaining
a string of ϵ-random bits that are trustworthy with the same level
of confidence.
Theoretical analysis. The theoretical analysis of the security of
the QRNG is made under the following assumptions:
A0 The predictions of quantum mechanics are reliable.
A1 The measurement performs homodyne detection on a
single-mode and the measurement outcome is linear in the
quadratures.
A2 The quantum state that is measured is a single mode
thermal state with stationary mean photon number.
The analysis of the QRNG follows a device-dependent
approach, which assumes that the system (and therefore the
min-entropy of the source) does not change after system
characterization (A2). The quantum side information comprises
all information that can be extracted from the environment of the
QRNG, i.e., from the rest of the universe. Therefore, under
assumptions A0–A2, the bits extracted by the QRNG are random
with respect to all (quantum and classical) side channels.
Following A2, homodyne detection is performed on a single
optical mode in a thermal state, which at a given time is
characterized by the field quadratures q̂ and p̂.
The physical model of our device is derived in “Methods.”
There we show that our device performs the measurement
q̂ ¼ gðX̂a þ N̂Þ ; ð2Þ
where g is a gain factor, X̂a is the quadrature operator of the
vacuum mode entering the central beam splitter, and N̂ is a noise
operator describing all noise sources.
In the following, we first present a theoretical analysis of a
source emitting i.i.d. (independent and identically distributed)
quantum states, i.e., a source of infinite bandwidth, and an ideal
analog-to-digital converter (ADC). We then extend the security
analysis to imperfect ADCs. Finally, we extend to a source with
finite bandwidth that emits correlated (non-i.i.d.) quantum states
at different times.
Limit of identical and independent distribution. Under ideal
conditions, homodyne detection would allow us to measure the
quadrature of a target optical mode, which in our setting is in the
vacuum state. However, as discussed in detail in “Methods,”
because of experimental imperfections, this vacuum signal is
mixed with noise. Therefore, the non-ideal homodyne detector
measures the quadrature q̂ of a mode, denoted in the following as
S, that is not in the vacuum state. Following assumption A2, said
state is a thermal state, which we denote as ρS. We recall that a
thermal state is uniquely characterized by the mean photon
number n.
We require the random numbers to be statistically independent
of any quantum or classical side information. Therefore, we need
to analyze the correlations between the measured system S and its
environment E. Following A0, the joint state of S and E is
necessarily a pure state, ψSE, as the combined system SE is by
definition isolated27. There exist infinitely many purifications ψSE
of the thermal state ρS. However, these purifications are all
equivalent up to local unitary transformations in the environment
E, and thus they all have the same information content27. To
perform our theoretical analysis, it is therefore sufficient to
consider any of these purifications. We choose the two-mode
squeezed vacuum (TMSV), which is a two-mode Gaussian state
that purifies the thermal state24. The environment E is thus
described by a single bosonic mode.
The outcome X of homodyne detection on a thermal state with
mean photon number n is a continuous real-valued variable,
whose probability density distribution is
pXðxÞ ¼ Gðx; 0; g2ð1þ 2nÞÞ ; ð3Þ
where g is a gain factor and





denotes a Gaussian in the variable x, with mean μ, and variance v2.
In our QRNG, the continuous variable X is mapped into a
discrete and bounded variable X due to the use of an ADC with
range R and bin size Δx. We therefore consider a model in which
X is replaced by a discrete variable X that assumes values j= 1, 2,





where Ijs are d intervals that discretize the outcome of homodyne
detection. This models an ideal ADC without errors.
The correlations between the discretized outcome X and the















dx pXðxÞρxE : ð7Þ
Here jj i are orthogonal states representing the possible discrete
outcomes and ρxE describes the post-measurement quantum state
of the environment. The explicit expressions of these quantities
are given in “Methods,” and the full derivation is in Supplemen-
tary Note 2.
We will now quantify the rate of the QRNG in terms of the
conditional min-entropy with quantum side information. Given
the state ρXE in Eq. (6), the min-entropy of











denotes the operator norm, i.e., the largest eigenvalue,
and the supremum is over a density operator γE for the












, where IX is the identity operator on X. The log
has base 2.
In “Methods,” we compute a lower bound on this quantity
following a particular choice for γE. The final result (which
includes an optimization over the gain g—see “Methods” for the
unoptimized result) is




























ADC digitization noise. The above result assumed an ADC
without digitization errors and noise. However, those imperfections
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reduce the extractable min-entropy. Given the true digitization
outcome j, the noise replaces it with a different, possibly random,
output f. For any given f, we count up to M possible true values j
that map into f. In “Methods,” we show that this reduces the min-
entropy by at most logM bits, i.e.,
HminðXjEÞ≥HminðXjEÞ
ideal  logM ; ð12Þ
with HminðXjEÞ
ideal
given in Eq. (9).
Beyond i.i.d.: stationary Gaussian process. We now consider the
more realistic scenario of finite bandwidth. In the experimental
implementation, the finite detection bandwidth, described by the
impulse response of the detector, defines the temporal mode of
the measured quantum state. Correlations arise due to the tem-
poral overlap of the different modes. The process is still stationary
and Gaussian (A2), however, not i.i.d. Here we use theoretical
tools from information theory29 and signal processing30 to ana-
lyze this stationary Gaussian process. We first obtain a virtual i.i.
d. model for the non-i.i.d. process. Then we apply the results of
the previous section to compute a lower bound on the min-
entropy with quantum side information of said virtual i.i.
d. model.
The analysis deals with two stochastic processes. One is the
outcome X of the homodyne measurement. The second stochastic
process, denoted as U, describes the excess noise, i.e., all
fluctuations in the measurement that are not purely vacuum
fluctuations, including electronic noise of the detector and
intensity noise of the local oscillator laser. Both X and U are
stationary and Gaussian processes (A2). When a measurement is
performed at a given time t, the homodyne outcome is denoted as
Xt. Similarly, we denote as Ut the excess noise at time t.
The homodyne measurement outcome Xt comprises several
components. Part of it comes from pure vacuum fluctuations and
part comes from the excess noise. However, because of the finite
bandwidth, Xt also contains a component that is determined by
past measurement outcomes, denoted as X<t. The component
from past measurement outcomes is considered as side
information.
We write the variance of Xt as σ
2 ¼ σ2X þ ζ , where ζ accounts
for the fluctuations of X<t, and σ
2
X accounts for all fluctuations
that are independent of the past, i.e., the variance of Xt
conditioned on X<t. The conditional variance σ
2
X accounts for
both pure vacuum fluctuations and for the excess noise. The
conditional variance of the excess noise is denoted as σ2U , and the
variance of pure vacuum fluctuations is thus obtained as σ2X  σ2U .
Below we develop a theory that allows us to determine the
quantities σ2X , ζ, and σ
2
U .
Let us first consider the stochastic process X. Given the time
series of measured values xtk , x̂ðλÞ ¼
P
kxtke
ikλ is the Fourier
transform, for λ∈ [0, 2π]. The power spectral density (PSD) is
then defined as f XðλÞ ¼ jx̂ðλÞj
2. The variance σ2 and the PSD can
be both estimated experimentally. In turn, from the PSD we can
estimate the entropy rate29,30,
hðXÞ ¼ 1
2









2πlog ½2πef XðλÞ ð14Þ
is the conditional variance. The same formal relation links the
PSD and the entropy rate of the excess noise U,
hðUÞ ¼ 1
2










is the conditional variance of the excess noise.
Because of the finite bandwidth of the measuring apparatus,
both the homodyne outcome Xt and excess noise Ut, at a given
time t, are correlated with their values at previous times. To filter
out the effects of these correlations, we consider the probability
density distribution of Xt, conditioned on all past homodyne
measurement outcomes,
pXt ðxt jx < tÞ ¼ Gðxt ; μt ; σ
2
XÞ ; ð17Þ
where xt denotes the possible values of the variable Xt at time t,
x<t denotes the collection of values of all homodyne measurement
outcomes at times t0 < t, and μt is the conditional mean value of
Xt. Note that, if p(x1, x2,…xn) is a multivariate Gaussian
probability distribution, the conditional distribution p(x1∣x2,…
xn) is also Gaussian. Also note that σ
2
X does not depend on time
because X is stationary (this follows, for example, from Eq. (13)).
Although the mean value μt may depend parametrically on the
past values x<t, the random variable Xt is (by definition)
conditionally independent of previous homodyne outcomes.
Therefore, we can formally describe it—once the previous
measurement outcomes are known—as the outcome of a
measurement applied on correlation-free quantum state with
variance σ2X . We thus identify (using the notation of Eq. (3)):
σ2X  g2ð1þ 2nÞ : ð18Þ
We can then write the (unconditional) variance σ2 as
σ2 ¼ g2ð1þ 2nÞ þ ζ ; ð19Þ
which allows us to obtain ζ ¼ σ2  σ2X .
In summary, we have defined an effective i.i.d. model for the
non-i.i.d. signal. The i.i.d. model is characterized by the
parameters n and g in Eq. (18). To determine these parameters,
we need a second equation in addition to Eq. (18). Such a second
equation is obtained through the conditional variance of the
excess noise.
For the excess noise Ut, we can similarly write the probability
density distribution conditioned on past values, i.e.,
pU t ðut ju< tÞ ¼ Gðut ; νt; σ
2
UÞ ; ð20Þ
where ut denotes the possible values of the variable Ut at time t,
u<t denotes its past values, and νt is the conditional mean value of
Ut. The quantity of interest is the conditional excess noise
variance σ2U . We identify the latter with the variance of the excess
noise in the i.i.d. model:
σ2U  2g2n : ð21Þ
By inverting Eqs. (18) and (21), we obtain the parameters n











Finally, we need to account for the term ζ, which describes the
fluctuations due to past measurements. We incorporate this in the
variance of the excess noise and redefine









In conclusion, we use this virtual i.i.d. model to compute a
lower bound for the min-entropy of the non-i.i.d. process, where
ARTICLE NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-20813-w
4 NATURE COMMUNICATIONS |          (2021) 12:605 | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-20813-w |www.nature.com/naturecommunications
the values for g and n in Eq. (3) are given in Eq. (22) and (24),
respectively. In turn, this allows us to estimate the min-entropy
rate using Eq. (9) (see also Eqs. (62) and (67) in “Methods”). This
is plotted in Fig. 2 for varying excess noise, ADC resolution, and
temporal correlations. The x-axis of the plot is the ratio of the
conditional variance of the vacuum fluctuations and the excess
noise, i.e., the quantum noise to excess noise ratio of the virtual i.i.
d. process. If, as assumed for the plot in Fig. 2, the homodyne
measurement outcomes and the excess noise have similar
temporal correlations, this ratio is independent of the amount
of correlations. The amount of correlations present in the system
is instead characterized by the ratio σ2X=σ
2, which takes the value
of 1 for an i.i.d. process and becomes smaller for increasing
temporal correlations. For each ADC resolution, the upper traces
in Fig. 2 show the extractable min-entropy when almost no
correlations are present. Obviously, stronger correlations yield
lower randomness.
Similar to the result for classical side information8, we show
that random numbers can in principle be generated for noise
treated as quantum side information as well and even in the large
excess noise regime. This is due to the fact that relatively small
vacuum fluctuations can give a substantial contribution to the
entropy if the ADC resolution is sufficiently high. This property is
preserved even when a large amount of temporal correlations is
present in the recorded data (lower traces in Fig. 2). However, as
discussed below, increasing the precision may not necessarily lead
to an increase in the min-entropy in the presence of digitization
errors.
System characterization. To be able to apply the theoretical
result obtained above to our experimental implementation, we
need to provide evidence that our implementation indeed fulfills
the assumptions. This is in fact a difficult task and a detailed
discussion can be found in “Methods.”
We are now in a position to estimate the min-entropy through
characterization of our set-up. According to the theoretical
analysis, the min-entropy can be found by determining the
variance σ2 as well as the conditional variances of the homodyne
measurement outcomes σ2X and the excess noise σ
2
U . To obtain a
conservative, and thus reliable, estimate of the min-entropy, it is
important that the measurement of these parameters does not
rely on any ideality assumptions of the homodyne detector.
The first two parameters σ2 and σ2X can be directly established
from the PSD fX(λ) of the homodyne measurement outcomes.
The excess noise parameter σ2U is, however, more involved as its
amount is determined by several sources whose individual
contributions is too cumbersome to determine. Our goal is thus
to establish the PSD of the excess noise fU(λ) by determining the
contribution of the vacuum fluctuations to the total noise. σ2U can
then be computed from fU(λ)= fX(λ)− fvac(λ), where fvac(λ) is the
PSD of the vacuum fluctuations.
To establish a lower bound on fvac(λ), we basically consider the
homodyne detector as a box (see Fig. 3a) with a quantum state
input and an input–output relation given by Eq. (2) with
unknown parameters. Our strategy is thus to measure the TF of
the box by probing it with known quantum states and to use this
result to conservatively calibrate the PSD of the vacuum
fluctuations. This method allows us to establish a lower bound
on the vacuum fluctuations under all experimental conditions, in
particular where other noise sources couple into the detector, e.g.,
intensity noise of the laser due to imperfect common-mode
rejection or stray light coupling into the signal port—likely to be
an issue with integrated photonic chips.
The TF of the box is measured by injecting a coherent state in
the form of a second laser beam (independent of the local
oscillator laser) with low power Psig into the signal port of the
beam splitter as displayed in Fig. 3a. A typical beat signal is
shown in Fig. 3b obtained by computing an averaged period-
ogram from the sampled signal. We record the TF(ν) by scanning
the frequency of the signal laser. At each difference frequency ν,
we determine the power of the beat signal and normalize it to Psig.
At high signal-to-noise ratio, the root-mean-square power of the
beat signal is purely a function of the coherent state amplitude
(determined by the signal laser power). It is independent of the
noise of the detector, since the second term in Eq. (2), the noise
term, can be neglected. The first term depending on the
quadrature operator X̂a can be decomposed into a dominating
term depending on the coherent state amplitude and a negligible
term depending on the noise of the input state, rendering the
root-mean-square power independent of the laser noise
properties.
Since the vacuum noise was amplified to optimally fill the
range of the ADC, we used a 20-dB electrical attenuator with flat
attenuation over the frequency band of interest to avoid
saturation, see Fig. 3a. The result of the TF characterization,
normalized to a maximum gain of 1, is shown in Fig. 3c.
Given the linearity of the detector (A1), we obtain the PSD of
the vacuum fluctuations by multiplying the TF(ν) with the shot
noise energy hωL contained in 1 Hz bandwidth, where h is
Planck’s constant and ωL is the angular frequency of the local
oscillator laser. By modeling the inner workings of the box, we
confirm in Supplementary Note 5 that with this procedure we
indeed obtain a lower bound on the PSD of the vacuum
fluctuations.
The conservatively estimated PSD of the vacuum fluctuations is
shown in Fig. 4a together with the actually measured PSD of the
signal. The spectra are clearly colored which indicates that the
data samples are correlated and therefore non-i.i.d. This is further
corroborated in Fig. 4b, where the autocorrelation of the
homodyne measurement outcomes is plotted. It justifies the
importance of using the min-entropy relation associated with
non-i.i.d. samples.
From the PSDs, we calculate the three parameters for obtaining
the min-entropy, which are summarized in Table 1. By
Fig. 2 Min-entropy versus the conditional quantum signal-to-noise ratio.
Min-entropy for 8-, 12-, and 16-bit analog-to-digital converter (ADC)
resolution versus the ratio of conditional variance of the vacuum











are the conditional variance of the measurement outcomes
and of the excess noise, respectively. The shaded areas indicate the regions
between low correlations (σ2
X
=σ2 ¼ 0:99), upper trace and high
correlations (σ2
X
=σ2 ¼ 0:1), lower trace. Thereby σ2 is the variance of the
measurement outcomes, which has been optimized to obtain the highest
min-entropy. The ADC is assumed to be ideal without digitization errors.
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Fig. 3 Characterization of the transfer function of the detection system to obtain the vacuum fluctuation noise level. a Experimental set-up for the
characterization. VATT variable optical attenuator, PD photo diode, ADC analog-to-digital converter, FPGA field-programmable gate array, RAM random
access memory. b Power spectrum from a typical measurement. The transfer function is determined by the amplitude of the beat note. c Transfer function
of the homodyne detector and the electronics including the analog-to-digital converter. Inset: transfer function with linear frequency scale.
Fig. 4 Experimental results. a The figure shows the power spectral densities (PSDs) of the measurement outcomes, the calibrated vacuum fluctuations
(obtained by the system characterization), and the excess noise (obtained by subtracting the PSD of the vacuum fluctuations from the PSD of the
measurement outcomes). b Autocorrelation coefficients calculated from the measured samples and averaged 1000 times. The inset shows a zoom.
c Relative frequency of the digitization error of the analog-to-digital converter (ADC) with respect to the digitization results. The non-linearity and
digitization noise of the ADC leads to a large reduction of the min-entropy.
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minimizing the min-entropy over the confidence set of the
estimated parameters, we obtain 10.74 bit per 16-bit sample with
a failure probability of ϵPE= 10−10 (i.e., the probability that the
actual parameters are outside the confidence intervals) under the
assumption of an ideal ADC.
Finally, we characterized the digitization error of our ADC,
which is shown in Fig. 4c. The measurement protocol is described
in Supplementary Note 3. The reduction of the min-entropy due
to the digitization error is 7.23 bit with a confidence of 2 × 10−6 as
500,000 measurements have been used to construct the histogram
for each digitization result. Thus this yields a total min-entropy of
3.51 bit. This relatively large reduction is due to the fact that our
ADC is four-way interleaved and has a large analog bandwidth.
Discussion
We have demonstrated a QRNG based on the measurement of
vacuum fluctuations with real-time extraction at a rate of 2.9
Gbit/s and security against quantum side information. Our
QRNG has a strong security guarantee with a failure probability
of N 0  ϵhash þ ϵPE þ ϵADC þ ϵseed ¼ N 0  1032 þ 3 ´ 1010 þ 2´
106 þ ϵseed, where N 0 is the number of QRNG runs in the past
with the same seed for the randomness extractor, ϵhash is the
security parameter related to the removal of side information [see
Eq. (1)], ϵPE= 10−10 is the security parameter of the estimation
of one parameter, ϵADC= 2 × 10−6 is related to the confidence of
the digitization error measurement, and ϵseed describes the
security of the random bits used for seeding the randomness
extractor. Since quantum side information from the past has to be
taken into account, ϵhash grows with time2.
We chose ϵhash= 10−32 to keep N
0
ϵhash low enough to, in
principle, be able to generate Gaussian random numbers with
security ϵ= 10−9 for a single execution of a continuous variable
quantum key distribution (QKD)5 protocol with 1010 transmitted
quantum states even after 10 years of continuous operation of the
QRNG. See Supplementary Note 6 for details. We note, however,
that in our case the ϵ-security parameter is limited by ϵADC. In
our experiment, the seed bits were chosen with a pseudo-random
number generator, which does not allow us to give a security
guarantee for ϵseed. The generated random numbers passed both
the Dieharder31 and the NIST 800-90B32 statistical batteries of
randomness tests.
Due to the choice of a very small ϵhash, the real-time speed of
our QRNG was limited to 2.9 Gbit/s by the input size of the
Toeplitz extractor required by our FPGA implementation.
Without limitations to the matrix size, a speed of 3.5 Gbit/s could
be reached. The main limitation to the available min-entropy is
the ADC digitization error.
Our QRNG is suited for use in high-speed QKD links, for
instance, in GHz clocked discrete variable33 as well as in high-
speed continuous-variable QKD (CVQKD)34. For Gaussian-
modulated CVQKD, the uniform random number distribution
has to be converted to a Gaussian distribution, which requires a
larger random number generation rate. Furthermore, QKD
requires composable security and a guarantee of privacy of the
random numbers as provided by our system.
Further developments to guarantee reliable operation over a
long time and to fulfill requirements by certification authorities
would need to include power-on self-tests and online testing of
the parameters in the security analysis as well as the generated
random numbers. Finally, the removal of the Gaussianity and
stationarity assumptions in the security analysis, which are in
practise difficult to verify, would further strengthen the security of
the QRNG.
Methods
Physical model. Here we will develop a physical model of the QRNG using a
description of optical modes by annihilation and creation operators in the Hei-
senberg picture35. A schematic of our detector depicting the involved modes and
parameters is shown in Fig. 5. Mode operators â and b̂ denote the signal and local
oscillator, respectively. The signal and the local oscillator are mixed at the central
beam splitter, which, under ideal conditions, has 50% splitting ratio. In our model,
we consider that the splitting ratio of the central beam splitter may deviate from
perfect balancing by Δ. The optical modes at the output of the central beam splitter
are measured by a pair of photo diodes, with quantum efficiencies η1 and η2,
respectively. The non-unit efficiencies are modeled by introducing the auxiliary
modes l̂1 and l̂2 . Opto-electrical conversion is described by the constant K.
The local oscillator laser mode b̂ can be written as b̂ ¼ hb̂i þ δb̂  βþ δb̂,
where hb̂i is the expectation value and δb̂ describes the fluctuations. We operate
our homodyne detector in the strong local oscillator regime, so that products of
operators describing fluctuations are negligible: δx̂δŷ  0. We note that with local
oscillator photon flux in the range of 1015 the detector operates deep within the
strong local oscillator regime.









































Fig. 5 Physical model of the QRNG showing the involved modes. The local
oscillator described by the mode b̂ interferes with the vacuum state
described by mode â at a beam splitter with reflectivity 1
2
þ Δ. The photo
diode efficiencies are modeled as beam splitters with transmittivities η1 and
η2, where the output modes from the central beam splitter are interfered
with vacuum modes l̂1 and l̂2. The difference of the two photo currents from
photo diodes PD1 and PD2, each generated by the light described by
conversion factor K, is amplified electronically by hamp, during which
electronic noise is added to the output of the detector.
Table 1 Summary of the parameters determined by system
characterization.
Parameter Value
σ2 3.96 × 107 ± 0.09 × 107
σ2
X
3.29 × 107 ± 0.07 × 107
σ2
U
2.49 × 107 ± 0.06 × 107




Min-entropy, ideal ADC 10.74 bit
Reduction due to ADC digitization error 7.23 bit
Min-entropy 3.51 bit
Calculated secure length 1027 bit
Extracted length 1024 bit
Variance of the measurement outcomes σ2, the conditional variance of the measurement
outcomes σ2
X
, and the conditional variance of the excess noise σ2
U
with their confidence intervals
for ϵPE= 10
−10. The calculated min-entropy for an ideal analog-to-digital converter (ADC)
minimized over the confidence intervals, the reduction due to ADC imperfections with ϵADC=
2 × 10−6, the secure length according to the leftover hash lemma, and the length of the
extracted random sequence in the experiment.
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After subtraction and amplification, we obtain
q̂ ¼ Kĉy ĉ Kd̂yd̂ ð27Þ
¼ β~gBþ ~gAX̂a þ ~gBX̂b þ ~gL1X̂l1 þ ~gL2X̂ l2 ð28Þ
with ~g :¼ Kβ. Here we have introduced the quadrature operators
X̂a ¼ âþ ây ; ð29Þ
X̂b ¼ δb̂þ δb̂
y
; ð30Þ
X̂ l1 ¼ l̂1 þ l̂
y
1 ; ð31Þ
X̂ l2 ¼ l̂2 þ l̂
y
2 ; ð32Þ
and the pre-factors are given by







































The homodyne detection circuit implements a high-pass filter that removes the
first term, which is constant. For an ideal homodyne detector, with Δ= 0 and η1=
η2= 1, the output current of the detector reduces to
q̂0 ¼ ~gX̂a : ð37Þ
All the other terms that appear in Eq. (28) are treated as noise. We define the noise
operator, N̂ ¼ ðBX̂b þ L1X̂l1 þ L2X̂ l2Þ=A, and rewrite Eq. (28) as




with g ¼ ~gA. Note that electronic noise can also be modeled in this way, by
attributing it to fluctuations in the auxiliary modes l̂1 and l̂2 or in the local
oscillator mode δb̂. The goal of the QRNG system is to extract bits from the
measured homodyne output q̂, with the requirement that these bits are random
with respect to the noisy variable N̂ . This requirement means that the extracted
random bits look random to an agent that has perfect knowledge, not only of the
system specifications but also of N̂ . Note that the noise comes from the fluctuations
of the variables X̂b , X̂l1 , and X̂l2 and is thus ultimately of quantum nature. For
example, an agent may prepare the initial state of the modes l̂1 and l̂2 and measure
them after the interaction at the beam splitters shown in Fig. 5.
The finite bandwidth of the detector can be modeled by its impulse response
hamp, which is the Fourier transform of its frequency response. The output voltage
is then given by
VoutðtÞ ¼ qðtÞ  hampðtÞ ; ð39Þ
where * is a convolution. Electronic noise also has finite bandwidth, and we assume





In our calibration method, described in the main text, we replace the vacuum
state in the signal mode â with a coherent state. This allows us to estimate the
contribution of the vacuum fluctuations, X̂a , to the PSD of the detector output.
Theoretical analysis in the i.i.d. limit. Consider a single optical mode char-
acterized by the quadrature operators q̂ and p̂. For a thermal state ρS with mean
photon number n, the first moments of the field quadratures vanish, and the














where we, as a matter of convention, put the variance of the vacuum equal to 1. In
the equation above, we use hÔi :¼ tr ðρSÔÞ for operator Ô. For such a state, the
output X of homodyne detection is distributed according to a Gaussian law,
pXðxÞ ¼ Gðx; 0; g2ð1þ 2nÞÞ ; ð42Þ
where g is a gain factor.
As discussed above, the measured state ρS is purified into a TMSV. Thereby the
second optical mode of this TMSV state, characterized by the field quadratures q̂e
and p̂e , is associated with the environment, i.e., the rest of the universe. The TMSV




hq̂p̂þ p̂q̂i hq̂q̂ei hq̂p̂ei
1
2
hp̂q̂þ q̂p̂i hp̂2i hp̂q̂ei hp̂p̂ei
hq̂eq̂i hq̂ep̂i hq̂2ei 12 hq̂ep̂e þ p̂eq̂ei

















































The correlations between the outcome X of ideal homodyne detection and the
quantum side information in its environment are described by the CQ state
ρXE ¼
Z
dx pXðxÞ xj i xh j  ρxE ; ð45Þ
where xj i are orthogonal states used to represent the possible outcomes of
homodyne detection, and the integral in Eq. (45) extends over the real line. The
state ρxE is the conditional state of the environment for a given measurement output
value x. Without loss of generality, we consider the case where the quadrature q̂ is
measured. We can then compute (see Supplementary Note 1 for details of the













as well as the CM
hq̂2ei 12 hq̂e p̂e þ p̂e q̂ei
1
2










The continuous variable X is mapped into a discrete and bounded variable X




dx pXðxÞ ; ð48Þ
where Ijs are d intervals that discretize the outcome of homodyne detection. In a
typical setting, these d non-overlapping intervals Ij are of the form
I1 ¼ ð1;R ; ð49Þ
Id ¼ ðR;1Þ ; ð50Þ
and for j= 2,…, d− 1
Ij ¼ ðaj  Δx=2; aj þ Δx=2 ; ð51Þ
with aj=− R+ (j− 1)Δx/2 and Δx= 2R/(d− 2). This choice of the intervals
reflects the way in which an ideal ADC with range R and bin size Δx operates in
mapping a continuous variable into a discrete one. However, ADCs are not ideal
devices, and below we show how the digitization error of the ADC reduces the
min-entropy.
In terms of the discrete variable X, the correlations with the environment are















dx pXðxÞρxE : ð53Þ
We are now ready to quantify the rate of the QRNG in terms of the conditional
min-entropy. Given the state ρXE in Eq. (52), the min-entropy of
X conditioned on
the eavesdropper (denoted with the letter E) reads28
HminðXjEÞρ ¼ sup
γE







denotes the operator norm (equal to the value of the maximum
eigenvalue), and the supremum is over a density operator γE for the environment
system.
Since a direct computation of the min-entropy is not feasible, as it requires an
optimization over all density operators γE in an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space,
we instead focus on finding a computable lower bound. A first lower bound on the
min-entropy is obtained by computing k γ1=2E ρXE γ
1=2
E k1 for a given choice of
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the state γE, so that we have
















where the last equality holds because the eigenstates jj i of ρXE in Eq. (52) are
mutually orthogonal. Here we set γE equal to a Gaussian state with zero mean and
CM
1þ 2ðnþ δÞ 0
0 1þ 2ðnþ δÞ
 
; ð57Þ
where the parameter δ will be optimized a posteriori to improve the bound.
























E k1 ; ð59Þ
which implies













Since ρxE and γE are both Gaussian states, the above lower bound can be
computed using the Gibbs representation techniques developed in ref. 36.
Employing these techniques and additional tools, ref. 37 derived a formula for the













ðnþ δÞð1þ nþ δÞ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi












To simplify the notation, we define
g 0 :¼ g
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi


























For j= 2,…, d− 1, this latter quantity reads
Z
Ij






























and for j= 1 and j= d,
Z
I j




























   
: ð67Þ
We remark that this is in fact a family of lower bounds parameterized by δ and g.
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: ð69Þ















Note that erf Δx
2g 0
 





is monotonically increasing with values in [0, 1/2). This implies












If g 0 > g 0 , then Qðg 0Þ ¼ erf Δx2g 0
 
>Qðg 0Þ, and if g 0 < g 0 , then





>Qðg 0Þ. This implies that g 0 is a local and global maximum for
the function Q.













with g 0 implicitly given in Eq. (71).
ADC digitization noise. ADCs are not ideal devices and are subject to digitization
error. We model the digitization error by introducing:
1. A classical noise variable N, with associated probability distribution pN;
2. A function f that describes how the noise variable i combines with the
noiseless output value j to produce the noisy output f= f(j, i).
Using this model, the quantum side information about the output of the noisy




pXðjÞ f ðj; iÞj i f ðj; iÞh j  ρj  pN ðiÞ ij i ih j ; ð73Þ
where we have introduced a dummy quantum register N to keep track of the noise
value i.
We want to ensure that the randomness extracted is also independent on the
noise variable N, therefore, we compute the min-entropy conditioned on EN,

















pXðjÞpN ðjÞ f ðj; iÞj i f ðj; iÞh j  γ
1=2










































where Sf denotes the set of values of j, i such that f(j, i)= f.
Putting γEN ¼ γE 
P
ipN ðiÞ ij i ih j, we obtain


















































where Sf∣i is defined as the set of values of j such that f(j, i)= f for a given value of i.
We further define Jf as the set of values of j such that f(j, i)= f for some value of i.
It is difficult to estimate Sf∣i without making further assumptions on the noise
underlying the ADC. However, we can experimentally estimate the cardinality ∣Jf∣
of the set Jf. Note that Jf contains Sf∣i for all i. We can then write a computable
bound in terms of ∣Jf∣:
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Here the first inequality follows from the fact that Jf contains Sf∣i for all i; the second
inequality follows from the triangular inequality; the third inequality follows from
the fact that the supremum is larger than the average; and the fourth inequality is
obtained by replacing the supremum over j∈ Jf with the supremum over all values
of j.
In conclusion, when compared with an ideal noiseless ADC, the randomness is
reduced by at most b bits, with b ¼ log supf jJf j½ .
Verification of assumptions in the theoretical analysis. An integral part is the
verification that our implementation indeed fulfills the assumptions made in the
theoretical analysis of the QRNG.
A1. The physical model above verifies that our detector indeed performs homodyne
detection.
The condition of the measurement of a single mode are given due to the
following arguments: The local oscillator laser has a side-mode suppression of >70
dB and therefore operates in a single frequency mode. The local oscillator
furthermore defines the polarization and the spatial properties (given by the single
mode fiber) of the measured mode. The temporal properties are given by the
impulse response of the homodyne detector and the following electronic circuits.
The linearity of our detector has been tested by connecting the output to an
electrical spectrum analyzer instead of the ADC. Varying the power of the signal
laser in the TF calibration set-up, see Fig. 3, we verified its linear operation. We
note that the linearity of the output of the homodyne detection circuit before it is
sampled by the ADC is the important figure of merit. Nonlinearities introduced by
the ADC are taken into account separately by the ADC characterization.
A2. The excess noise in the thermal state stems from relative intensity noise of the
laser and the electronic noise of the homodyne circuit. Both are independent of the
phase between local oscillator and the measured quantum state and can therefore
be modeled as phase invariant state.
Having established the phase invariance of the measured state, we verify the
Gaussianity of the measured signal. This can only be shown approximately and is
displayed in Fig. 6a where we show the probability quantiles of the measured
samples and compared those to the theoretical quantiles of a Gaussian distribution.
This completes the verification of the assumption in the security proof that a
thermal state is measured.
We are left with that the mean photon number of the thermal state shall be
stationary. Also this can only be proven approximately. We computed the
overlapped Allan deviation of the measurement outcomes, which is shown in
Fig. 6b. It is clearly visible that in the short term the noise processes are stationary.
Over longer times, some fluctuations become evident, which could lead to a lower
min-entropy at times than estimated. A power stabilization of the local oscillator
laser could improve this figure of merit. We, however, leave this investigation for
future work.
Real-time randomness extraction. Having calculated the min-entropy, the next
step is to extract random numbers. This is done by using a strong extractor based
on a Toeplitz matrix hashing algorithm in which the seed can be reused38. We
chose matrix dimensions of n= 5632 bits and m= 1024 bits, which corresponds to
352 input samples with a depth of 16 bit and an output length m < l, chosen such
that Eq. (1) was fulfilled with Hmin ¼ 3:51 bit and ϵhash < 10−32. The 16-bit samples
provided by the ADC at a rate of 1 GHz are received by the FPGA in chunks of 64
bits at a rate of 250MHz. For the algorithm implementing the Toeplitz hashing, we
followed the approach of ref. 20. Every clock cycle 64 bits were stored in a block
until n-bits were accepted, after which the next block started receiving data. For
each full block, we carried out the hashing multiplication with bit-wise AND and
subsequent XOR operations on the Toeplitz matrix by first splitting up the matrix
into submatrices of width 16 bit and then shifting the data through the operations.
When the hashing was completed, the m-bit-wide output data was stored in a
register, and the next block was processed. The achieved throughput was 2.9 Gbit/s.
Reporting summary. Further information on research design is available in the Nature
Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
Data availability
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Code availability
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